$2M Coin Poker Hack

TOTAL LOST $2.0M
Medium Access Control

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2024 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #629 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Access control Target category

Incident Overview

On Nov 18, 2024, CoinPoker’s hot wallet was compromised across Binance Smart Chain, Ethereum, and Polygon, leading to the theft of approximately $2 million in USDT. The attacker gained access to the wallet, swapped the stolen funds into various native tokens on multiple chains, and ultimately funneled them through Tornado Cash to obscure their trail.

The hack involved multiple transactions that suggested CoinPoker’s hot wallet was operating under specific custodial policies. With unauthorized control established, the attacker systematically moved funds into native currencies and took advantage of cross-chain swaps to facilitate laundering. This series of transfers indicates a well-coordinated strategy, leveraging known privacy tools like Tornado Cash, and highlights the ongoing vulnerability of centralized crypto custodial solutions.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project $2M Coin Poker
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Access Control
Classification Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gaming / Metaverse / Gam
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Access control
Official Website coinpoker.com/
Protocol Twitter/X @CoinPoker_OFF
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Gambling Polygon Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of $2M Coin Poker's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Access Control audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to $2M Coin Poker, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2024).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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