Balancer V2 Hack

TOTAL LOST $128M
Critical #67 All-Time Composable Stable Pools Exploit / Access Control arbitrum base ethereum optimism polygon sonic

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain arbitrum 6 chains affected
Recovered $48.8M 38.1% returned
All-Time Rank #67 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

On November 3, 2025, Balancer V2 suffered a major smart contract exploit across multiple chains, resulting in approximately $128 million in losses. The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the Vault's manageUserBalance function, specifically targeting improper authorization and callback handling during pool initialization to drain assets from liquidity pools.

The attack targeted Balancer's V2 Vault architecture, which serves as a central accounting hub for all pools. The vulnerability existed in the manageUserBalance function that handles internal balance operations. Initial analysis suggested the function improperly validated msg.sender against user-provided op.sender fields, though deeper forensic work by auditors like kebabsec revealed the root cause may involve state mutations during withdrawal proxy setup that left the Vault in a permissive state.

The attacker deployed a malicious contract that manipulated Vault calls during pool initialization, exploiting improper authorization checks and callback handling to bypass safeguards. This enabled unauthorized withdrawals of internal balances across interconnected pools in rapid succession. Assets were drained primarily on Ethereum ($70M), with additional losses on Base, Sonic ($7M combined), and other chains (~$2M+), totaling $128M in WETH, wstETH, osETH, frxETH, rsETH, and rETH.

Key Exploit Transaction (Ethereum):

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd1552072…b48569

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Balancer V2
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) arbitrum base ethereum optimism polygon sonic
Attack Technique Composable Stable Pools Exploit / Access Control
Classification Protocol Logic / Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Dexs
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website balancer.fi/
Protocol Twitter/X @Balancer
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Decentralized Exchange (DEX) Token DeFi DAO Ethereum Ecosystem Yield Farming AMM Three Arrows Capital Portfolio Governance

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of Balancer V2's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Composable Stable Pools Exploit / Access Control audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $128M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Balancer V2, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2025).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Composable Stable Pools Exploit / Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Funds Recovery

38.1%

Recovered

$48.8M

Net Loss

79232000

Security Audit History

Post-Incident Timeline

  • 2025-11-28

    Total Recovered: ~$48.8 million StakeWise Recovery: $20.7 million Berachain Full Recovery: $12.8 million White-hat and Internal Recoveries: ~$8 million Additional MEV Bot Recoveries: $750,000+

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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