Bittensor Supply-Chain Hack
What happened
On July 2, 2024, Bittensor halted transaction processing after wallet thefts linked to the malicious PyPI distribution of bittensor 6.12.2. Attackers obtained decrypted wallet keys and used them to authorize TAO transfers. Reports valued the stolen tokens at roughly $8 million.
This was a client-software and key-custody incident, not a failure of Bittensor consensus.
Malicious wallet.py code in the PyPI release transmitted unlocked key material to an attacker-controlled server. Independent analysis found that code absent from the corresponding GitHub release.
Case & protocol details
How it happened
The compromised package ran with access to wallet secrets. When affected users unlocked their keys, the inserted code could exfiltrate the key material. Possession of those keys allowed ordinary signed transfers; no forged consensus vote or Solidity contract call was required.
The independent investigation compared the PyPI source and wheel with the GitHub release. It considered a compromised publishing credential likely, but did not prove how the attacker obtained it.
For maintainers, reviewing repository code alone is insufficient: the distributed artifact must match the reviewed build. For affected wallets, reinstalling clean software does not make an already exposed key secret again.
Evidence & learning
Attack pattern
Compare incidents →Sources and on-chain records
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