bZx Hack

TOTAL LOST $47.6M
High #134 All-Time Access Control

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2021 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #134 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Access control Target category

Incident Overview

The private key controlling BSC and Polygon deployments was compromised, allowing attackers to transfer ownership of the core bZx contracts and withdraw users' deposited collateral.

The attackers initiated the exploit by transferring ownership of the core bZx contracts. This was done by invoking the target contract with a method through a fallback function with delegatecall. This allowed the attackers to withdraw users' deposited collateral from interest iTokens into another address. The same method was used on the Polygon chain.

Involved addresses:

- Exploiter 1: 0x74487eed…5254d4

- Exploiter 2: 0x0acc0e5f…f35fa5

- Exploiter 3: 0x967bb571…737e31

- Exploiter 4: 0x6551fb9b…e8dd0e

The transaction behind the attack:

- setTerget(): https://bscscan.com/tx/0x57e4aa5f…d52199

- transferOwnership(): https://bscscan.com/tx/0x9b16f5e8…bf01b9

- iDOGE => DOGE: https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd1cff35d…1ec18d

- iETH => ETH: https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa288f212…50ca88

- iBNB => BNB: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x2dbb3df6…597b6a

Incident Report

Protocol / Project bZx
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Access Control
Classification Borrowing and Lending
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Access control
Affected Token BZRX
Official Website bzx.network/
Protocol Twitter/X @bzxHQ
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of bZx's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Access Control audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to bZx, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (November 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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