FlippazOne Hack

TOTAL LOST $7K
Low Access Control

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2022 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1935 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Access control Target category

Incident Overview

The creators of the FlippazOne project created a NFT smart contract, which is also an auction contract. The contract included a serious vulnerability in the ownerWithdrawAllTo() function, in which there is no verification of the owner, which allows anyone to take all the funds of the contract through calling this public function.

The contract creator of FlippazOne created a contract with a vulnerability that enables anyone to withdraw all $ETH from the contract to any address. The vulnerability lies in the fact that this function does not have a check on the owner, which means anyone can pick up $ETH tokens to their address at any time. This account with address (https://etherscan.io/address/0x194a39f4…ff0b14) made a bid sending 1.5 $ETH to the FlippazOne contract that were successfully withdrawn by unverified contract (https://etherscan.io/address/0xb314fd4a…9c82b6) in this transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x670da209…031fa0.

Then another 4 $ETH were withdrawn by EOA address in this transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf2cc19d4…0a3762

As the time of this writing information on this case is scarce. More sources will be added if the case should develop.

Vulnerable contract address: https://etherscan.io/address/0xE85A08Cf…c3e944

Contract owner and creator: https://etherscan.io/address/0x7f377ee9…99d9d3

Incident Report

Protocol / Project FlippazOne
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Access Control
Classification NFT

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Access control
Affected Token FlippazOne
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of FlippazOne's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Access Control audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to FlippazOne, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

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