Garden Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $11.0M
High Other

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2025 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #293 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Dexs Target category

Incident Overview

On October 30, 2025, Garden Finance, a cross-chain DeFi platform, suffered a major exploit resulting in approximately $10.8-11 million in losses across multiple blockchains. The attacker drained liquidity pools containing WBTC, USDC, and USDT before converting them to ETH, with Garden offering a 10% white-hat bounty for fund recovery.

The sophisticated attack targeted Garden Finance's multi-chain infrastructure, with initial losses estimated at $5.5-6 million before being revised upward to $10.8-11 million as forensic analysis continued. The attacker systematically drained liquidity pools across multiple chains, focusing on wrapped Bitcoin (WBTC), USD Coin (USDC), and Tether (USDT), then rapidly converting stolen tokens to Ether in what investigators described as a well-coordinated and premeditated operation. Garden Finance disputed claims that its core smart contracts were compromised, attributing the attack to vulnerabilities in third-party integrations, though independent investigator ZachXBT provided data suggesting the breach was multi-chain in scope affecting components spanning several networks.

The platform quickly paused certain functions and sent an on-chain message offering a 10% white-hat bounty to the attacker. The incident occurred just days after ZachXBT accused Garden of facilitating money laundering, claiming over 25% of its traffic came from illicit sources.

Exploiter Addresses:

0x98bcc6c3…ea2d12 (EVM chains)

WZy4xxpqktWa1b6MPMRiWsD487CT8mDcapB6GufBJCH (Solana)

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Garden Finance
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Other
Classification Bridge

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Dexs
Official Website app.garden.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @gardenfi
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Polygon Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Garden Finance's contract logic - root cause: bridge
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Other audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Garden Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2025).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Sources & References

Learn to Prevent the Next Garden Finance

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