Harvest Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $33.8M
High #162 All-Time Flashloan Price Oracle Attack / Flash Loan Attack ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered $2.5M 7.4% returned
All-Time Rank #162 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in the FARM_USDT and FARM_USDC pools, stealing $33.8 million through a series of flash loans and price manipulation.

The attacker initiated the exploit by swapping 11.4 million USDC for USDT, causing the price of USDT to rise. They then deposited 60.6 million USDT into the Vault. Following this, they exchanged 11.4 million USDT back to USDC, causing the USDT price to drop. The attacker then withdrew 61.1 million USDT from the Vault, making a profit of 0.5 million. This process was repeated 32 times. The stolen funds were then converted to renBTC and exited to BTC / ETH via Tornado Cash.

Stolen funds:

- $33.8M USDT

The attacker's address:

https://app.zerion.io/0x3811765a…5f119b/history

The transaction behind the attack:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9d093325…7a2dc1/advanced

Detailed transaction analysis:

https://ethtx.info/mainnet/0x9d093325…7a2dc1

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Harvest Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Flashloan Price Oracle Attack / Flash Loan Attack
Classification Ecosystem / Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Yield Aggregator
Affected Token FARM
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website harvest.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @harvest_finance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
DeFi DAO Ethereum Ecosystem Yield Farming Yield Aggregator Governance Polygon Ecosystem BNB Chain Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flashloan price oracle attack / flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Harvest Finance's contract logic - root cause: ecosystem / yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flashloan Price Oracle Attack / Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $33.8M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Harvest Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2020).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flashloan Price Oracle Attack / Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Audit oracle price feeds for manipulation risks - ensure time-weighted average prices (TWAPs) or multi-source aggregators are used, not spot prices
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Funds Recovery

7.4%

Recovered

$2.5M

Net Loss

31298799

Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available
poc-exploits - harvest finance

Sources & References

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