Multichain Hack

TOTAL LOST $231M
Critical #44 All-Time Access Control

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #44 By amount stolen
Auditors 4 Prior security audits

Incident Overview

Multichain, a crosschain bridge, was exploited leading to an estimated loss of 231,000,000 $USD.

Cross-chain Bridge Multichain faced an exploit resulting in nearly $130 million being siphoned out of various token bridges. The assets locked up in the Multichain MPC address were moved abnormally to an EOA address. The unexpected outflows led to Multichain’s Fantom Bridge losing its entire holdings in wBTC, USDC, USDT, and a handful of altcoins, worth over $130 million in total.

Similar outflows were observed from Multichain’s Moonriver and Dogecoin bridge contracts. The assets transferred out of the Multichain Fantom bridge include DAI, LINK, USDT, wBTC, wETH, and USDC. Multichain team announced the team is not sure what happened.

The most possible cause of the exploit is wallet compromise, but there is also the possibility of an insider hack.

Suspicious Addresses:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x418ed255…6e5bb7

https://etherscan.io/address/0x027f1571…b05cd8

Funds Moving Transactions:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xda80a8c8…5fe62e

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xbd29fe07…477fc4

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Multichain
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Access Control
Classification Bridge

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Bridge
Official Website multichain.org/
Protocol Twitter/X @MultichainOrg
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Ethereum Ecosystem Three Arrows Capital Portfolio Polygon Ecosystem Fantom Ecosystem Arbitrum Ecosystem Moonriver Ecosystem BNB Chain Ecosystem Circle Ventures Portfolio

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of Multichain's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Access Control audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1, Audit Report 2, Audit Report 3, Audit Report 4 — still lost $231M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Multichain, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (July 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Post-Incident Timeline

  • 2023-07-10

    On July 10, 2023, the Multichain project, experienced another significant exploit incident. Indicating that unauthorized access to the system was gained, leading to a substantial loss of funds across various chains. The funds were transferred to the single EOA in nine chains. The transfer behavior suggested that the attacker had control over all the assets and was not in a hurry to move them, leading to speculation that the incident could have resulted from an internal operation. Here is the breakdown of the funds lost by chain: - Arbitrum: $14,371,766 USD worth of USDC, WETH, and WBTC - Fantom: $48,560,731 USD worth of USDC, WETH, DAI, WBTC, and over 60,000,000 non-liquid fUSDT tokens - Optimism: $11,080,749 USD worth of USDC, DAI, and WBTC - Cronos: $10,911,004 USD worth of USDC, WETH, and DAI - Polygon: $10,990,882 USD worth of USDC, WETH, and WBTC - Avalanche: $3,190,649 USD worth of DAI and WBTC - Binance Smart Chain: $1,770,304 USD worth of USDC and BTCB - Moonbeam: $237,657 in USDC - Ethereum: $15,291 USD worth of DAI The total amount stolen in liquid assets is approximately $101,129,033 USD.

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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