Rubixi Hack

TOTAL LOST $7K
Low Access Control

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2016 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1936 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Access control Target category

Incident Overview

Rubixi contract had a security issue, which allowed anyone to become a contract owner and withdrew fees.

Rubixi was a project on the Ethereum chain designed to collect funds and had a privileged function to collect fees. The contract itself had a logic issue, which allowed anyone to become a contract owner and withdraw fees for themselves. The constructor of the contract was named wrong and become a regular function.

After becoming a contract owner, anyone can call the unprotected function collectAllFees() to withdraw fees. The contract currently has only 4 $ETH, which is stuck and can't be withdrawn.

Deployment transaction:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4496b642…8f8ec3

Contract deployer:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xdd68da49…68ad60

Owner change example:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9385dca4…10684c

Withdrawal example:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x580222b0…7dd472

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Rubixi
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Access Control
Classification Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Access control
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Operational-security tradecraft (phishing, malware, leaked seed phrases, or insider access) to obtain treasury signing authority
Capital Required Minimal capital - only enough to cover gas while draining the compromised accounts
On-Chain Access Valid signing authority over the compromised wallets / multisig signers, allowing direct transfer of funds or stake authorization
Target Reconnaissance Identification of Rubixi's high-value treasury accounts and the authority / multisig structure controlling them
Execution Speed Speed to drain the compromised accounts before the team detects the breach and revokes signing authority or freezes the assets
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Access Control audit checklist and test coverage

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Rubixi, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2016).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Access Control are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Access Control Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Access Control Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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