AurataGoldCat Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

AurataGoldCat (AUGC, 9 decimals) limits transferFrom to one hard-coded address: require(from == _owner, "You are not the owner!");. A decentralized-exchange sale moves the seller's tokens through transferFrom, so for every holder other than that address the call reverts, while transfer has no check, so purchases paid out by a pool and wallet-to-wallet sends are not affected. The address in _owner is the deployer, 0x4C31d7FE…d282D5, and the source has no function that changes it.

The comment block at the top of the source describes a 10% tax (5% to holders, 5% to liquidity), but the code contains no fee logic: transfer moves the full amount. De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Honeypot and describes it as: the contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens. The listing dates the incident 2021-06-13 and gives no loss figure.

How it happened

  1. The constructor sets name = "AurataGoldCat", symbol = "AUGC", decimals = 9 and _totalSupply = 1000000000000000000000000 (1e24 raw units, 1e15 tokens), and credits all of it with balances[msg.sender] = _totalSupply;. The state variable address private _owner = 0x4C31d7FE36f20cd848f52C57B53cB697C2d282D5; is hard-coded to the deployer address.
  2. transfer only subtracts from the sender and adds to the recipient, with no condition and no fee, so tokens can leave a pool to a buyer and move between wallets.
  3. transferFrom begins with require(from == _owner, "You are not the owner!");. A holder who sells through a router approves it and the router calls transferFrom(holder, pool, amount); with from equal to the holder, the require reverts.
  4. The source never assigns _owner after deployment (it is private, with no setter), so the check cannot be relaxed. Only a call whose from is the deployer address can pass it.
  5. What the code allows: buyers can acquire and hold the token, and the deployer address alone can sell through the router path. What is documented as having happened: De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Honeypot; no opened transaction shows a specific sale, liquidity removal or loss amount.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract AUGC

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