BLUEHYPER Honeypot

What the code allows:

1. transfer and transferFrom both call the private _transfer, whose fourth line is require(tx.origin == to || tx.origin == owner()); with no revert message.
2. A buy through an AMM sends tokens from the pair to the buyer. The buyer started the transaction, so tx.origin == to and the transfer passes.
3. A sell through an AMM calls transferFrom(holder, pair, amount). to is the pair and tx.origin is the holder, so neither side of the || is true and the sale reverts. The same check also reverts an ordinary transfer from one wallet to another, because the recipient is not the originating wallet.
4. Any transaction started by the owner passes through tx.origin == owner(), so the owner can transfer or sell where holders cannot. owner() returns the stored _owner, and the contract also defines renounceOwnership(); an eth_call read on 2026-09-30 returned the deployer address as owner, which is not historical evidence of what the owner did.
5. The fee setters are not capped: setTaxFeePercent(uint256 taxFee) and setliquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFee) write _taxFee and _liquidityFee directly. _getTValues computes tTransferAmount = tAmount.sub(tFee).sub(tLiquidity), so a combined rate of 100 leaves the recipient with 0 while the sender is debited the full rAmount, and a combined rate above 100 makes sub revert for every fee-paying transfer. The owner and the contract address are excluded from fees by default.

De.Fi's REKT database lists BLUEHYPER as an exit scam/honeypot dated 2021-06-05 where holders could not sell. No transaction showing a failed sale, a fee change, or liquidity removal was opened for this record.