Incident Overview
On the 26th of March BNQ on the BSC chain was rugged for ~$72K USD.
- The BNQ deployer previously was funded by the tornado.cash, so we can claim it was a rug pull.
- The contract owner initiated a function safePull() call to receive a significant amount of BNQ
- The scammer received 190,000,000 BNQ and swapped the largest part for $72,652USDT.
Tornado cash funding:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x7094b0a3…b1710c
Transfer:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x97824224…624b28
Example of swap:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x11914bba…b957dd
safePull calls:
https://bscscan.com/token/0x5c530131…13fc96?a=0x49fe5c4d…a11896
Incident Report
Protocol Information
Market Context at Time of Hack
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to BNQ, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2023).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
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The BNQ hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.