Incident Overview
The attacker's address:
https://bscscan.com/address/0x4622a1f3…b6a207
The transaction behind the attack:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa9860033…502710
The attacker:
- took nine flash-swaps and added liquidity into the WBNB / BOG pool. Each flash-swap led to 47,770 BOG and the entire process consumed 88,159.43 WBNB with 83,440.57 LP tokens minted
- staked the minted 83,440.57 WBNB / BOG LP tokens into the BOG token contract for profit sharing
- performed 434 self-transfers in the total transfer amount of 18.74M BOG, resulting in an increased balance of 151K BOG
- sold the extra BOG on WBNB and then exchanged on anyETH
- removed the added liquidity in the first step and completed the flash-swaps.
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Bogged Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (May 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- Audit Report 1 Report
Related Attack Classes
The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:
Sources & References
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