Incident Overview
The transaction behind the attack:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x82f95242…da2a9a
The attacker's address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x358abccb…015878
The exploiter made a total profit of 31.87renBTC and 211 ETH, and used REN and Tornado.Cash to transfer assets anonymously. Deposits into Tornado Cash mixer:
https://bloxy.info/txs/calls_from/0x358abccb…015878?signature_id=994162&smart_contract_address_bin=0x905b63ff…ec7601
Ren BTC Gateway:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa1821af4…3323c3
The address of the stolen BTC fund:
https://btc.com/btc/transaction/7c849b024e7f3a56287b52bc7f55db5425a4204efcd2c117f5621ef821fbe0cd
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to BT.Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSecurity Audit History
- PeckShield Inc. Report
Related Attack Classes
The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:
Sources & References
Learn to Prevent the Next BT.Finance
The BT.Finance hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.