ChainGPT Rug Pull

What the code allows:

1. The constructor mints 1,000,000,000 tokens to the deployer and whitelists it: _totalSupply = 1000000000e18; _balances[_msgSender()] = _totalSupply; _whitelist[_msgSender()] = true;.
2. transfer and transferFrom contain no balance logic. Each is a call such as proxyAddr.delegatecall(abi.encodeWithSignature("transfer(address,uint256)",recipient,amount)), so whatever code sits at proxyAddr runs against the token's own storage: balances, allowances, _blacklist, _whitelist and _totalSupply. proxyAddr is not set in the constructor and its code is not in the verified files.
3. The proxy address is changeable: function setProxyAddr(address _addr) public { require(_whitelist[msg.sender] == true, "No permission."); proxyAddr = _addr; }. Whitelisted addresses can repoint it at any time, and the owner controls the whitelist through addWhitelist(address[] memory accounts) public onlyOwner.
4. The owner can also maintain a blacklist with addBlacklist(address[] memory accounts) public onlyOwner, but _blacklist is not checked anywhere in the verified code; any enforcement would live in the proxy, which could not be read.
5. function mint(address account, uint256 amount) onlyOwner public virtual returns (bool) has no cap, and Ownable offers only transferOwnership (it rejects the zero address), so ownership cannot be renounced. The current on-chain totalSupply read in the campaign metadata is about 2.5 trillion tokens against the 1 billion minted at deployment; this read does not show whether mint or the proxy produced the difference.

What was reported:

6. CertiK Alert reported a large liquidity removal on CGPT, about 43.4K USD removed by the deployer. De.Fi's REKT database lists the deployer removing liquidity from the pair and selling a large quantity of tokens, with a price drop of about 90%. No transaction page was opened, so this analysis does not show whether mint, the blacklist or the proxy was used, or who held the LP tokens.