Clober Hack

TOTAL LOST $500K
Low Reentrancy

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2024 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1003 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

On December 10, 2024, CloberDEX’s Liquidity Vault on the Base network was exploited through a reentrancy vulnerability in the _burn() function, resulting in the theft of approximately 133.7 ETH (~$501,279).

The exploit stemmed from the _burn() function in the Rebalancer contract, where token transfers occurred before critical state variables (pool.reserveA and pool.reserveB) were updated. This deviation from the checks-effects-interactions pattern enabled a reentrancy scenario. The attacker could repeatedly call the function, exploiting the unmodified reserve values to miscalculate withdrawal amounts and drain significant funds.

By timing interactions and re-entering the contract mid-execution, the attacker extracted 133.7 ETH without triggering immediate safeguards. In response, CloberDEX promptly contacted the attacker, requested the stolen funds be returned, and reassured users that the incident did not compromise Clober Core or threaten the integrity of the Mitosis testnet.

Attacker

https://basescan.org/address/0x012fc637…aa6025

Exploit tx

https://basescan.org/tx/0x8fcdfcde…361c04

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Clober
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Reentrancy
Classification Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Dexs
Official Website www.clober.io/
Protocol Twitter/X @CloberDEX
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Cardano Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of reentrancy and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Clober's contract logic - root cause: exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Reentrancy vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $500K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Clober, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (December 2024).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Reentrancy are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Reentrancy attack class for patterns
  • Check that all state-changing functions follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern to prevent reentrancy and logic ordering bugs
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

Free Trial

Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Reentrancy examples →

Sources & References

Learn to Prevent the Next Clober

The Clober hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

Recreate exploit patterns safely Free Trial