Cornerchain Rug Pull

What the code allows:

1. The constructor mints the whole supply to the deployer and hands ownership to a constructor argument: _setOwner(_addr[5]); and _mint(msg.sender, initialSupply);.
2. Taxes are uncapped. function setSellTax(uint256 dev, uint256 marketing, uint256 liquidity, uint256 charity) public onlyOwner stores any values, and setBuyTax does the same. In handleTax, a sale (to == address(uniswapV2Pair)) computes tax += baseUnit * sellTaxes["marketing"]; (and the same for dev, liquidity, charity), moves it with _transfer(from, address(this), tax); and then runs amount -= tax;. The seller is debited the tax plus the remaining amount, so the full amount leaves the seller's balance. At a combined 100% the pair receives zero tokens, and above 100% amount -= tax underflows and the sale reverts under solc 0.8.10.
3. The owner can blacklist any address with function enableBlacklist(address account) public onlyOwner. _transfer rejects a transfer when any of require(!isBlacklisted(msg.sender), "CoinToken: sender blacklisted");, require(!isBlacklisted(recipient), "CoinToken: recipient blacklisted"); or require(!isBlacklisted(tx.origin), "CoinToken: sender blacklisted"); fails. For a router sale msg.sender is the router, recipient is the pair and tx.origin is the holder's wallet, so listing the holder, the router or the pair blocks sales.
4. function pause() public onlyOwner sets the pause flag, and require(!paused(), "CoinToken: token transfer while paused"); then rejects every transfer for every holder. renounceOwnership() exists and would end these powers; the chain read shows a non-zero owner, and no source says it was called.

, as listed by De.Fi's REKT database: 5. The listed scammer minted 10M CNR, created the pair, deposited 300 BNB of liquidity and, after buyers arrived, removed the liquidity for a profit of 196 BNB. The listing does not say that any tax, blacklist or pause function was used.