What happened
On October 27, 2021, an attacker used flash liquidity to manipulate the Yearn yUSD vault's pricePerShare, which Cream's PriceOracleProxy used to value collateral. After shrinking the vault and directly adding underlying assets, the attacker doubled the reported share price, inflated crYUSD collateral, and borrowed roughly $130 million from Cream's Ethereum v1 markets.
How it happened
- Cream relied on the Yearn yUSD vault's instantaneous pricePerShare to value crYUSD collateral.
- The attacker used flash liquidity to create a large collateral position, redeemed most yUSD shares to shrink the vault, then donated underlying assets to sharply raise the reported share price.
- The manipulated value doubled the apparent collateral and permitted borrowing across Cream's lending markets.
- Flash loans made the sequence atomic, but the core failure was a manipulable spot share-price oracle.
- Yearn later salvaged $9.42 million that had been donated during the manipulation, which was a partial recovery rather than an attacker refund.
Protocol details
Security review history
- Trail of Bits View report
Post-Incident Timeline
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2022-09-12
1000 $ETH was swapped for 80 $BTC and bridged using REN protocol from the attacker's second address
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2023-03-23
The Cream Finance team tweeted about their thoughts and findings about the exploited funds. They firmly believe that TradeOgre DEX is actively complicit in laundering the exploited funds for the exploiter, said in the tweet.
Evidence
- report Report archive.vn
- report Report archive.is
- report Post-mortem rekt.news
- report CREAM Finance October 27 post-mortem medium.com
- report Immunefi CREAM Finance exploit analysis medium.com
- transaction Etherscan exploit transaction etherscan.io
- analysis DeFiLlama defillama.com
- analysis Halborn CREAM Finance exploit analysis halborn.com
Understand the attack patterns
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