CS Hack

TOTAL LOST $714K
Low Flash Loan Attack

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #916 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Exploit/Flash Loan Attack Target category

Incident Overview

CS token's pool was exploited via a flash loan attack. The attacker used 80,000,000 $USD to manipulate the token price and made a profit of 714,285 $USD.

CS is a BEP20 token trading on PancakeSwap. The token's CS/USD pool was drained via a flash loan attack. The attack started from the malicious contract deployment by the exploiter, which took 80,000,000 $USD as a flash loan from the BSC-USD pool.

Consequently, multiple swaps with a small amount of 5,000 $USD was continuously repeated to manipulate the pool's price. After reaching some conditions, the attacker could swap the $CS tokens back with an unfairly high price and the total amount gained back went to 80,954,285 $USD. 240,000 $USD were paid back to the BSC-USD pool as a flash loan fee after the base amount was returned.

The exploiter's profit reached 714,285 $USD, which was transferred to the initial EOA, and then distributed between several addresses. All the malicious actions were performed in a single transaction.

Attacker address:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x2cdeee96…4027ba

Malicious transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x906394b2…87baa4

Malicious contract:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x90fa57d2…6ee2e3

Incident Report

Protocol / Project CS
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Token
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exploit/Flash Loan Attack
Affected Token CS
Official Website koinda.com/
Protocol Twitter/X @koindanomics
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

Market Context at Time of Hack

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in CS's contract logic - root cause: token
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to CS, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (May 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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