Cubic Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $217K
Low Rugpull ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1264 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The project was holding a presale event at:

https://app.bounce.finance/fixed-swap/5048

304 ETH were raised in total.

1. The contract deployer transferred tokens to the external wallet at:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x08779ce4…a805ec

2. The token recipient added initial and further liquidity at:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xcff977ee…816858

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb97cfbb3…1074bf

3. Only 18.23 / 304 ETH was used to add liquidity. In addition, the token was listed on the Hotbit exchange:

https://hotbit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360060184974-Hotbit-will-launch-CUBIC-Cubic-Finance-on-January-15th-2021

4. The token recipient from step 2 transferred part of tokens to the other external wallet at:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x84c16aa1…4ac41c

5. This external wallet deposited received tokens directly to the Hotbit exchange so further actions can't be tracked. Stolen funds were calculated based on the raised funds from the presale event minus added liquidity amount.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Cubic Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Farm
Affected Token CUBIC
Official Website www.cubic.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @cubicfinance

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Cubic Finance's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $217K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Cubic Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Sources & References

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