DHE Rug Pull

What the code allows:

1. The constructor credits the whole supply to a hard-coded address that is neither the deployer nor the router: address should = 0xa3427dD4909fA77780F5595512533734C971e7a6; _tOwned[should] = _tTotal; with _tTotal = 3990000 * 10 ** 18. The same address is put on the fee-exempt and liquidity-holder lists (addExcludedFromFee(should); ... _liquidityHolders[should] = true;), so its sales skip the 5% fee that other traders pay on pair trades.
2. The deployer is made owner (_owner = msgSender) and can flag any address with removeSniper(address account, bool success) external onlyOwner { _isSniper[account] = success; }.
3. _transfer starts with if (_isSniper[from]) { revert("Sniper rejected."); }. The check reads the sender, so a flagged holder's sell through the router (transferFrom(holder, pair, ...)) reverts.
4. After the first liquidity transfer to the pair sets launchedAt, the code flags buyers automatically: if ( launchedAt > 0 && from == uniswapV2Pair && !_liquidityHolders[from] && !_liquidityHolders[to]) { if (block.number - launchedAt < 2000) { _isSniper[to] = true; } }. Any non-whitelisted wallet that buys from the pair in that window becomes unable to move its tokens. The on-chain owner reads as the zero address as of 2026-09-30, so removeSniper can no longer be called now (the renounce time was not established).

What was reported:

5. De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Rugpull: a wallet holding the supply moved over 100,000 DHE to a second wallet, which dumped DHE against USDT on PancakeSwap on 20 June 2022, producing a 92% price drop and about 142k USDT gained. That source does not say whether any buyer was flagged by the sniper logic.