How much was lost in the DOXED hack?

The DOXED hack resulted in $30K in losses on February 05, 2023.

What attack technique was used in the DOXED exploit?

The DOXED exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

DOXED Hack

TOTAL LOST $30K

Low Feb 05, 2023 Rugpull

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

All-Time Rank #1826 By amount stolen

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull Target category

Incident Overview

Quick Summary

On Feb 5, 2023, the team behind the DOXED Token token executed a rug pull, resulting in a loss of funds worth $30k USD.

Details of the Exploit

The attack on the DOXED Token token involved the token contract deployer manipulating the liquidity pool by removing liquidity from the pair contract and selling a large quantity of tokens on the market. This resulted in a rapid drop in the token's price by approximately 90%. The deployer took advantage of their ability to manipulate the liquidity pool and market to execute a rug pull, effectively stealing funds from investors.

The exploit highlights the importance of careful token contract design and the need for investors to perform due diligence before investing in new projects.

Block Data Reference

Deployer:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xEDA3eB7A…CEe84e

Remove liquidity:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc88c2ce6…be4b40

Incident Report

Protocol / Project DOXED

Date of Incident February 05, 2023

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Token

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull

Affected Token DOX

Team Anonymous

Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in DOXED's contract logic - root cause: token

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to DOXED, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2023).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

Free Trial

Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://twitter.com/CertiKAlert/status/1622068094016581632?s=20

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

LOW

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Token
Year 2023

Learn to Prevent the Next DOXED

The DOXED hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.

Start Free Trial Browse Attack Library