ELON ORBIT Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

ELON ORBIT (ELONO) is a BNB Smart Chain token whose transferFrom records the first recipient it sees in a variable called newun and from then on rejects every transfer to that address with "please wait". If that first recipient is the liquidity pair, which is what happens when liquidity is added through a router that pulls tokens with transferFrom, nobody can sell into the pair afterward. The owner alone can change newun.

De.Fi's REKT database lists ELONO as an exit scam/honeypot dated 2021-05-04 and says the owner could restrict selling.

How it happened

  1. The constructor sets symbol = "ELONO", name = "ELON ORBIT", decimals = 18 and _totalSupply = 10000000000e18 (1e10 tokens), then runs balances[owner] = _totalSupply;. The owner is hard-coded in the Owned constructor as owner = 0x8B21e2C6F0B4bA426a6A74d6904eDE7673199B53;, so that address holds the whole supply and controls the owner-only functions. The deployer, 0x2199...b37B, is a different address and is not credited with any tokens by the code.
  2. The newun address starts empty. The first transferFrom call runs if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to;, so the recipient of that call is stored as newun, whoever it is. A router adding liquidity pulls tokens into the pair with transferFrom, so that call would set newun to the pair.
  3. After that, transferFrom takes the else branch: else require(to != newun, "please wait");, and transfer has require(to != newun, "please wait");. Any transfer whose recipient is newun reverts. A sell is a transfer of tokens to the pair, so with newun equal to the pair every sell reverts, for holders and for the owner alike (the owner has no exemption).
  4. Buys are unaffected, because tokens move out of the pair rather than into it, so holders can acquire the token but not sell it back.
  5. transfernewun(address _newun) is onlyOwner. Setting newun to an address nobody uses lifts the block; setting it to address(0) re-arms the capture so the next transferFrom recipient becomes the blocked address. The contract also has clearCNDAO(), which sends the contract's BNB balance to the owner.
  6. The code shows what is possible. No transaction was opened to show who the first transferFrom recipient was or whether the owner changed newun. The same pattern was described for BSC tokens in April 2021 in a third-party write-up on a "stealthy LP block".

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract ELONO

Evidence

Same attack technique

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