ElonDoge Honeypot

What happened

ElonDoge (EDOGE) is a reflection token whose _transfer skips its per-transaction limit only when the sender or recipient is the owner: if(from != owner() && to != owner()) require(amount <= _maxTxAmount, ...). The owner-only setMaxTxPercent has no minimum, so it can set _maxTxAmount to 0, after which every transfer between two non-owner addresses reverts, including sells to the pair and router-pulled transferFrom calls. setTaxFeePercent and setLiquidityFeePercent also have no cap.

De.Fi's REKT database lists EDOGE as an exit scam/honeypot, stating that the owner could disable the transfer function.

How it happened

1. The constructor mints the full supply to the deployer (_rOwned[_msgSender()] = _rTotal;) and makes it owner(); the pair is created against the router 0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E.
2. _transfer enforces a size limit on everyone except the owner: if(from != owner() && to != owner()) require(amount <= _maxTxAmount, "Transfer amount exceeds the maxTxAmount.");.
3. The owner can change the limit with setMaxTxPercent(uint256 maxTxPercent), which stores _maxTxAmount = _tTotal.mul(maxTxPercent).div(10**2);. Passing 0 stores 0, and the function has no lower bound.
4. With _maxTxAmount at 0, a transfer by a non-owner needs amount > 0 (require(amount > 0, "Transfer amount must be greater than zero");) and amount <= 0 at once, so it always reverts. Holder sells (holder to uniswapV2Pair) and buys (pair to buyer) are both blocked; transfers where the sender or recipient is the owner still pass.
5. Separately, setTaxFeePercent and setLiquidityFeePercent are onlyOwner with no cap. _getTValues computes tAmount.sub(tFee).sub(tLiquidity), so a combined fee of 100 leaves the recipient with 0 and a combined fee above 100 makes every non-exempt transfer revert on the SafeMath subtraction. excludeFromFee lets the owner exempt chosen addresses.
6. The code shows these powers only. No transaction was opened showing that setMaxTxPercent or the fee setters were called, and the current owner() read on 2026-09-30 (0x768f2ebd…5cdf94) differs from the deployer 0x5A2FD5bE…344bE5.

Protocol details

Classification Token

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot

Affected asset / contract EDOGE

Protocol links Website @elondogeio

Evidence

• report Report elondoge.io
• address ElonDoge token source (BscScan) bscscan.com
• analysis Sourcify match for 0x163f182c32d24a09d91eb75820cde9fd5832b329 repo.sourcify.dev