EMACITY TOKEN Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

EMACITY's _approve function stores a real allowance only when the approving address is one hard-coded address, 0x7f3b398C…97Af4d, which is also the deployer. For every other holder it writes an allowance of 0 and emits an Approval event showing 2. A DEX router sells by spending an allowance through transferFrom, so a router cannot pull tokens from an ordinary holder, and the sell reverts.

De.Fi's REKT database lists EMACITY as an Exit Scam/Honeypot on BNB Chain dated 2021-05-27, stating the contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens. No loss figure is given.

How it happened

  1. The constructor assigns the entire supply to the deployer: _balances[msg.sender] = _totalSupply;.
  2. approve, increaseAllowance and transferFrom all end in _approve, which contains the trap: if (owner == address(0x7f3b398C3cC537DF3705C09F87ea91AbE597Af4d)) { _allowances[owner][spender] = amount; ... } else { _allowances[owner][spender] = 0; emit Approval(owner, spender, 2); }.
  3. A holder who approves a router therefore stores 0 and sees an Approval event for 2, not the amount they chose.
  4. transferFrom runs _transfer(sender, recipient, amount); and then _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount, "BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"). With a stored allowance of 0, any non-zero amount fails the sub, so the whole call reverts. A router-based sale from an ordinary holder cannot complete.
  5. The hard-coded address is not affected, because its approvals are stored as written. The contract also has an owner-only mint(uint256 amount) that credits the caller; the code does not show it being used. An eth_call read of owner() at 2026-09-30 returned the zero address, but that is current state, not proof of what happened in 2021.
  6. No opened transaction shows a failed sale; the sell restriction is stated by the De.Fi listing. The cited Cryptot3ddybear write-up describes this same approval-rigging pattern, with a different hard-coded address, for other BNB Chain tokens.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract EMACITY

Evidence

Same attack technique

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