Equalizer Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $72K
Low Flash Loan Attacks

What happened

On June 7-th Equalizer Finance suffered from a flash loan attack. The EqualizerFinance has FlashLoanProvider contract that providers flash loans, and the Vault contract used for borrowing funds by calling flashLoan() function.

Flash loan attack explanation:

The attacker first borrows 165.3 WBNB from PancakeSwap using flash loan.

Event 15: https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdc4ea764…5035f0#eventlog

The FlashLoanProvider provider first transfers the WBNB liquidity to the attacker in the WBNB storage contract, which is then followed by the flash loan callback.

The attacker then provides liquidity to the WBNB repository in a second instant callback.

The attacker then returns the secondary flash loan and removes the liquidity from the WBNB vault.

By targeting the storage contracts in each chain, the attacker was able to withdraw liquidity from Equalizer Finance.

Attack transactions:

ETH - https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9b17f61d…c17f41

BSC - https://bscscan.com/tx/0xdc4ea764…5035f0

Attacker address:

BSC - https://bscscan.com/address/0x00000035…da526e

ETH - https://etherscan.io/address/0x00000035…da526e

Attacker contract address:

ETH - https://etherscan.io/address/0xf667e04a…29a67f

BSC - https://bscscan.com/address/0xf667e04a…29a67f

Case & protocol details

Classification Yield Aggregator
Protocol Type Exploit/Flash Loan Attack
Affected asset / contract EQZ
Official Website equalizer.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @EqualizerFlash

Evidence & learning

Sources and on-chain records

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