Fantasm Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $2.6M
Medium Missing Condition Check / Other fantom

Summarize with AI

ChatGPT Perplexity Claude Grok
Affected Chain fantom Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #584 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The exploiter's address:

https://ftmscan.com/address/0x47091e01…07ae8d

The exploiter:

- deployed contract to trigger the exploit

https://ftmscan.com/address/0x944b58c9…749e3e

- minted XFTM by input only FSM token without entering any FTM

- collected XFTM token

- sold XFTM token to FTM

- bought more FSM and repeated the first step to get a larger amount of FTM

- sold all his FTM for ETH and bridged these ETH to Ethereum via Celer Bridge

- deposited stolen funds into Tornado Cash mixer:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x47091e01…07ae8d

That contract exploited the error in Fantasm’s Pool contract where the developer missed the condition checking for the minimum amount of input FTM when minting XFTM.

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Fantasm Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) fantom
Attack Technique Missing Condition Check / Other
Classification Protocol Logic / Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Liquidity manager
Affected Token XFTM
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website fantasm.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @fantasm_finance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem
Protocol Links
GitHub

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of missing condition check / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with fantom smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Fantasm Finance's contract logic - root cause: protocol logic / other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Missing Condition Check / Other audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $2.6M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Fantasm Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Missing Condition Check / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Proof-of-Concept Exploits

1 PoC available
poc-exploits - fantasm finance
$ Fantasm Finance Business logic in mint()

On-Chain Evidence & References

Sources & References

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