ForceDAO Hack

TOTAL LOST $367K
Low Other

Summarize with AI

ChatGPT Perplexity Claude Grok
Affected Chain 2021 Incident surface
Recovered $367K 100.0% returned
All-Time Rank #1092 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

ForceDAO was exploited by one white hat and four black hat hackers.

The white hat hacker's address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xf88a427c…36b7b2

The black hat #1 hacker's address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x9d9c3695…b9b00b

The black hat #2 hacker's address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xe29a0700…2994dd

The black hat #3 hacker's address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x0608576e…03a0cb

The black hat #4 hacker's address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x00000b20…41457c

The root cause:

1. The exploited xFORCE vault is a fork of the xSUSHI contract, which assumes that a failed transfer will result in a reversion.

2. The token used in ForceDAO is an Aragon Minime token that returns false if a call to the transferFrom() function fails.

The ForceDAO hackers took advantage of this vulnerability: if a deposit into the xFORCE vault fails, the deposited tokens will remain in the sender’s wallet. However, on the vault’s side, the sender will receive xFORCE tokens in exchange because the code assumes that if it’s still running after the transfer, that the transfer went through successfully.

Black hat #1:

- minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdf05020d…5f0141

- withdrew FORCE, using minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3b60252b…afe118

- sold FORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x03c84e3f…a987e6

Black hat #2:

- minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7df2fe63…d4b9fd

- withdrew FORCE, using minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe7be5bf2…5ca8d1

- sold FORCE in multiple transactions:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xe29a0700…2994dd

Black hat #3:

- minted xFORCE multiple times:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x37b44d5d…f6e3d0

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6202403f…b34f00

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a27ee41…4135f8

- withdrew FORCE, using minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2616ae9f…c732a8

- sold FORCE in multiple transactions:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x0608576e…03a0cb

Black hat #4:

- withdrew FORCE, using minted xFORCE:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8aedc3d1…020317

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xef10be2c…75ebb6

- minted xFORCE multiple times:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xef10be2c…75ebb6

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf8352e96…911e39

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc4abacc3…898106

- sold FORCE in multiple transactions:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x00000b20…41457c

- later, funds were returned:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4d535b8c…60b793

Incident Report

Protocol / Project ForceDAO
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Other
Classification Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem #1 View Post-Mortem #2

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Lending
Affected Token FORCE
Official Website www.forcedao.com/
Protocol Twitter/X @force_dao
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
BNB Chain Ecosystem
Protocol Links
Discord

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in ForceDAO's contract logic - root cause: other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Other audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $367K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to ForceDAO, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (April 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Funds Recovery

100.0%

Recovered

$367K

Net Loss

0

Security Audit History

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