Furucombo Hack

TOTAL LOST $14.0M
High Delegatecall Exploit / Other ethereum

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain ethereum Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #269 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

Furucombo proxy contract was exploited, resulting in the loss of various tokens worth millions of dollars.

The attacker manipulated the Furucombo proxy contract to believe that Aave V2 had a new implementation. This new implementation had the ability to transfer all approved tokens to addresses controlled by the attacker. This was possible because users had approved the Furucombo contracts to use their tokens on their behalf.

The attacker was able to steal a variety of tokens including stETH, USDC, USDT, DAI, aWBTC, aWETH, aETH, aAAVE, WBTC, CRV, LINK, cETH, cUSDC, cWBTC, BAO, PERP, COMBO, PAID, UNIDX, GRO, and NDX. The total value of the stolen tokens is in the millions of dollars.

Attacker Address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xb624E2b1…76B212

Malicious Transaction:

https://ethtx.info/mainnet/0x5af11a27…1ee529/

Malicious Contract Address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x86765dde…0c4f04

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Furucombo
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) ethereum
Attack Technique Delegatecall Exploit / Other
Classification Smart Contract Language / Yield Aggregator,Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Services
Affected Token COMBO
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website furucombo.app/
Protocol Twitter/X @furucombo
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
DeFi Ethereum Ecosystem DeFiance Capital Portfolio Polygon Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of delegatecall exploit / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with ethereum smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Furucombo's contract logic - root cause: smart contract language / yield aggregator,other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Likely — with a thorough Delegatecall Exploit / Other audit checklist and test coverage
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $14.0M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Furucombo, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2021).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Delegatecall Exploit / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Delegatecall & Call Injection Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Delegatecall & Call Injection Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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