GAME Hack

TOTAL LOST $50K
Low Reentrancy

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2024 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1722 By amount stolen
Protocol Type Chain Target category

Incident Overview

GAME experienced a reentrancy attack resulting in a loss of 49,596 USD.

On February 12, 2024, an attacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability in a GAME's smart contract by repeatedly calling the makeBid() function. The stolen funds were transferred to another EOAs and then the part was deposited into FixedFloat, while the remainder was sent to an unknown address with over 2 million transactions. The attacker obtained 1.1 ETH from an address to which sent some of the stolen funds after the attack.

The attack began approximately 7 hours after the exploited contract was created.

Attacker Address:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x145766A5…675A0B

Address which funded the attacker:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x077D360f…e7C4A4

Malicious Transactions:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe07fa7cf…c2e32f

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1624cd34…68f6c7

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x0eb8f8d1…1bd5c4

Malicious Contracts:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d4dE2Bc…74D12a

https://etherscan.io/address/0x327aa670…B66dCd

FixedFloat Deposit Transaction:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf19de65b…57464b

Incident Report

Protocol / Project GAME
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Reentrancy
Classification Other
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Chain
Official Website game7.io/
Protocol Twitter/X @Game7HQ
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of reentrancy and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in GAME's contract logic - root cause: other
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Reentrancy vulnerabilities in code review

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to GAME, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2024).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Reentrancy are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Reentrancy attack class for patterns
  • Check that all state-changing functions follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern to prevent reentrancy and logic ordering bugs
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Reentrancy examples →

Sources & References

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