GODZILLA Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

GODZILLA (GZ) is a BEP-20 token on BNB Chain at 0x241e33bf…27bb59, deployed on 9 April 2021 by 0xe660a706…34B593 with a 100,000,000 GZ supply credited to that address. De.Fi's REKT database lists it as an exit scam/honeypot. The verified source does not switch transfer off; instead transferFrom requires the sender to be on an allow list, and at deployment only the deployer is on it.

DEX sales run through transferFrom, so every holder other than the deployer is blocked from selling through the router. The admin functions are guarded by a hard-coded address, 0xbd486897…439192, written as a decimal number, which can add wallets to the list or set any wallet's balance to any value with mint.

How it happened

  1. The constructor credits the whole supply to the deployer and allowlists only it: balances[msg.sender] = totalSupply; and allow[msg.sender] = true;.
  2. Buyers receive GZ from the PancakeSwap pair through transfer, which checks only the recipient and balance, so buys succeed.
  3. To sell, the router calls transferFrom, which includes require(allow[_from] == true);. A buyer is not on the list, so the sale reverts.
  4. onlyOwner ignores the stored owner and instead checks msg.sender == address(1080614020421183795110940285280029773222128095634), a decimal form of 0xbd486897…439192. That address alone can call addAllow(holder, allowApprove) to let chosen wallets sell.
  5. The same address can call mint(miner, _value), which sets balances[miner] = _value; for any wallet without changing totalSupply, so it can create tokens for itself or wipe a holder's balance.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract GZ

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