Gorillaz Sunshine Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
Ethereum
Honeypot

What happened

De.Fi's REKT database lists Gorillaz Sunshine (GRSUN) as an Exit Scam/Honeypot on Ethereum and says the owner could disable the transfer function, restricting users from selling. The verified code has no global transfer switch. It keeps one address in a variable called newun and reverts every transfer whose recipient equals it with the message "please wait".

newun is filled by the first successful transferFrom and can be reassigned by the owner at any time, so sells into a trading pool can be blocked while buys still work.

How it happened

  1. The constructor mints the full supply to the deployer, who is also the owner: balances[owner] = _totalSupply;.
  2. transfer rejects any transfer to the stored address: require(to != newun, "please wait");.
  3. transferFrom has a self-arming branch: if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to;. The first transferFrom that completes while newun is empty stores its recipient, and that call is not checked. Every later call runs else require(to != newun, "please wait");. Liquidity added through a router uses transferFrom, so the stored recipient is whichever address receives that first transfer. The code does not show which address newun holds on chain.
  4. Once newun is the address holders must send tokens to when selling, a sell reverts with "please wait". Only the recipient is checked, so transfers out of newun, such as a buyer receiving tokens, are not blocked.
  5. The owner can change the block at will with transfernewun(address _newun), which is onlyOwner. Setting it to the zero address re-arms the capture in step 3 on the next transferFrom; pointing it at an unused address lifts the block.
  6. clearCNDAO() is also onlyOwner and sends any ETH balance held by the token contract to the caller.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract GRSUN

Build your security review skills

Work through hands-on labs covering real exploit mechanics, review techniques, and defensive patterns.