Harvest Keeper Hack

TOTAL LOST $930K
Low Rugpull

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2023 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #855 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

Harvest Keeper was rugpulled via privileged function. 929,595 $USD were stolen in total across three chains.

Harvest Keeper claimed to be an AI-powered trading platform running on Binance, Ethereum, and Polygon chains. The platform was rugpulled by the contract owner via the privileged function getAmount(). The function allowed the contract owner to drain all remaining $USDT from the project's contract.

710,595 $USDT was siphoned out in a single transaction this way. 219,000 $USD worth of assets were stolen via ice phishing and then exploiting user approvals across Binance, Ethereum, and Polygon chains in addition. All the stolen funds were transferred through multiple EOA addresses.

Attacker addresses:

https://bscscan.com/address/0x027c83d2…95ade8

https://bscscan.com/address/0x250ce5a8…710c14

Malicious transaction:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3c9e53a9…a8809b

Approval exploits transaction example:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x12f1def8…896f7a

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Harvest Keeper
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Rugpull
Classification Yield Aggregator

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Rugpull
Official Website harvest-keeper.app/
Protocol Twitter/X @harvest_keeper
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Harvest Keeper's contract logic - root cause: yield aggregator
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope
Audited by ContractWolf — still lost $930K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Harvest Keeper, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2023).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Sources & References

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