InfinitySwap Honeypot

What the code allows (no transaction was opened, so which addresses the owner actually marked is not verified):

1. The constructor mints the whole supply to the deployer, who also becomes owner: _transferTO(msg.sender, 100000000e18); with Ownable setting _owner = _msgSender();.
2. The owner can mark any address as a blocked recipient: function setPanCakeSwapReciever(address _recipient, bool _feeless) public onlyOwner { ... PanCakeSwapReciever[_recipient] = _feeless; }. Unlike the feeless setters, it is not guarded by canWhitelist, so renounceWhitelist() does not disable it.
3. Every transfer, including transferFrom used by routers, goes through _transfer, which calls calculateFeesBeforeSend(sender, recipient, amount). That function contains if(PanCakeSwapReciever[recipient]){ revert("Error: Can not sell this token"); }.
4. The check looks at the recipient only, with no exemption for the owner or any sender. When the recipient is a marked address such as a trading pair, a holder's sell reverts and the sender's balance is restored, because the debit in _transfer happens in the same reverted transaction. Transfers into unmarked addresses and transfers out of a marked address are not affected by this check.
5. The flag is reversible (PanCakeSwapReciever[_recipient] = _feeless; accepts false), so the owner can unmark the pair. renounceOwnership() exists; calling it would freeze the flag in its current state.

The fee machinery is inert: calculateFeesBeforeSend ends with return (amount, 0);, so no fee is taken on any transfer.

De.Fi's REKT database lists INFNTY as an Exit Scam/Honeypot dated 2021-09-21, noting that the owner could disable the transfer function and restrict users from selling.