Kleeka Inu Honeypot

What happened

De.Fi's REKT database lists Kleeka Inu (Kleeka) as an Exit Scam/Honeypot and says the contract owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens. The verified source at 0x5e14b18d…d1cf7f on BNB Smart Chain shows the mechanism: transferFrom, the function a router uses to pull tokens from a seller, requires allow[_from] == true, and only the deployer is set to true at construction. Plain transfer has no such check.

The owner address is also hard-coded in the onlyOwner modifier and can switch any holder's flag and overwrite any balance.

How it happened

1. The constructor sets the deployer as the only allowed address: balances[msg.sender] = totalSupply; and allow[msg.sender] = true;. The allow mapping is mapping(address => bool) public allow;, so every other address defaults to false.
2. transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) contains require(allow[_from] == true);. A sale through a DEX router pulls the tokens with transferFrom(holder, pair, amount), so _from is the holder, whose flag is false, and the call reverts even when the balance and the allowance are sufficient.
3. transfer only has require(_to != address(0)); and require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);, so direct wallet-to-wallet transfers are not affected by the flag.
4. The owner can change who is allowed: function addAllow(address holder, bool allowApprove) external onlyOwner { allow[holder] = allowApprove; }. The modifier is modifier onlyOwner() {require(msg.sender == address(0xf560Dc23a6C4F4Ff35A5942335c1c9A72Cc1Ee47));_;}, a hard-coded address that equals the deployer in the deployment record; transferOwnership updates the owner variable but the modifier does not read it.
5. The owner can also rewrite balances: function mint(address miner, uint256 _value) external onlyOwner { balances[miner] = _value; } sets an address's balance to any value without touching totalSupply.
6. What happened is limited to the listing: De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Honeypot. No transaction, loss figure or liquidity record was opened, so the code shows how sells could be blocked, not which holders were affected or whether addAllow or mint was ever called.

Protocol details

Classification Token

Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot

Affected asset / contract Kleeka

Evidence

• report De.Fi REKT database listing for Kleeka (proof: Token Sniffer post) twitter.com
• address Kleeka verified source on BscScan bscscan.com
• analysis Sourcify match for 0x5e14b18d722bfe10f64fff1271a2e8238ad1cf7f repo.sourcify.dev