LaserSwap Cash Hack
Incident Overview
The contract deployer added initial liquidity at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xf893069f…e100bf
The contract deployer transferred LP tokens to the external wallet at:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xe2ef4781…c46000
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x7c0f2701…dce46f
The LP token recipient deposited tokens to the MasterChef, which was behind the upgradeable proxy contract. All deposited LP tokens were migrated by the external wallet at this transaction:
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xc4b822ce…5bce7a
The liquidity was removed by the external wallet at:
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0x5a0f5394…95b1b6
https://www.bscscan.com/tx/0xea7abc74…d668df
The stolen funds were distributed between multiple wallets at:
https://explorer.bitquery.io/ru/bsc/txs/transfers?sender=0x94e981a4…7ddbd8¤cy=0xe9e7cea3…087d56
Incident Report
Protocol Information
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to LaserSwap Cash, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2021).
- Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSources & References
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01
Source 1 https://www.laserswap.cash/
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Learn to Prevent the Next LaserSwap Cash
The LaserSwap Cash hack is one of many attacks that skilled auditors are trained to detect before deployment. Master real exploit patterns and defense techniques with hands-on Web3 security training.