Laugh Out Loud Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

Laugh Out Loud (LOL) is a BNB Smart Chain token whose internal _transfer reverts any transfer between two non-owner addresses unless the sender is the stored pancake address, and the owner can switch that check off with setTIME. The revert message claims "YOU CAN ONLY SELL 1 Sale PER 30 MIN", but the code contains no timer: the check is a plain sender test. A holder selling to the pair is a transfer from a non-owner, non-pancake address, so it reverts while the switch is on.

De.Fi's REKT database lists LOL as an Exit Scam/Honeypot in which the contract owner could disable transfers and so restrict holders from selling.

How it happened

  1. The constructor mints the whole supply (_mint(msg.sender, 100000000000000e18)) to the deployer, who is the owner. The private flag TIME is initialised to true.
  2. Whenever the owner is the sender, _transfer stores the recipient: if(sender == owner()){ pancake = recipient; }. The owner can also set it directly with addPancake(address).
  3. The trap line is if(sender != owner() && recipient != owner() && sender != pancake && TIME == true){ revert("FOR VALUE PROTECTION, YOU CAN ONLY SELL 1 Sale PER 30 MIN"); }. A holder who sends tokens to anyone other than the owner, including to a liquidity pair, is a non-owner sender that is not pancake, so the call reverts. Transfers from pancake (for example buys, if pancake is the pair) and transfers to or from the owner pass. The code does not show which address pancake holds.
  4. No timestamp is compared. saveTransData(sender, block.timestamp) writes transData[sender], but nothing in the contract reads transData, so the "1 sale per 30 min" wording is not backed by logic.
  5. The owner can lift or restore the block with setTIME(bool). Separate owner-only levers exist: GTYA(address,bool) flags a sender in bot, and a flagged sender then hits require(amount <=0, "bots......"), which cannot pass because _transfer already requires amount > 1000. POOL and fire set the SWAP addresses and the MAX cap checked as require(amount <= MAX, ...) for transfers to them while security is on, and setFee allows a fee of up to 10% (_newTxFee <= 100 with amount.mul(txFee).div(1000)).
  6. renounceOwnership() exists, so the owner can give these powers up. The code alone does not show whether or when any of them was used.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract LOL

Evidence

Same attack technique

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