lightningshib.com Honeypot

What the code allows:

1. The constructor gives the whole supply to the deployer, 0xEe80ba78…F77076, and allow-lists only that address: balances[msg.sender] = totalSupply; and allow[msg.sender] = true;.
2. transferFrom begins with require(allow[_from] == true);. Any account that is not on the list cannot move tokens through an allowance, which is how a router moves a seller's tokens into a pool.
3. transfer contains no allow check (require(_to != address(0)); require(balances[msg.sender] >= _value);), so a pool paying out to a buyer, and plain wallet-to-wallet sends, are not blocked.
4. A holder who buys therefore receives tokens, but a sell that calls transferFrom(holder, pair, amount) reverts because allow[holder] is false.
5. The list can only be edited by addAllow(address holder, bool allowApprove) external onlyOwner. The onlyOwner modifier is require(msg.sender == address(0x8c1442F868eFE200390d9b850264014557A38B45)), a hard-coded address that differs from the deployer. No function changes that address, and transferOwnership only rewrites the unused owner variable.

De.Fi's REKT database lists LISHIB as an Exit Scam/Honeypot with no stated loss. No transaction was examined here, so whether addAllow was called, whether holders' sells reverted on-chain or whether liquidity was removed is not established.