Mango Markets V3 Hack

TOTAL LOST $116M
Critical #73 All-Time Price Oracle Attack / Other solana

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain solana Incident surface
Recovered $69.0M 59.5% returned
All-Time Rank #73 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The Mango Markets exchange was exploited by market manipulation. The attacker profited from the total amount of 116,000,000 $USD.

Mango Markets is a DeFi Exchange on the Solana chain. The attacker used two addresses to pump the $MNGO price and used the tokens to take a loan of 116,000,000 $USD from various pools. From the first address, the attacker bought $MNGO tokens for 5,000,000 $USDC and created opened position.

From the second address, the same amount of the tokens have been bought and a long position opened for hedging purposes. Consequently, the attacker was able to pump the token price due to little liquidity in the pool. After the accident, the exploiter opened a proposal on MangoDAO for returning the user's deposit funds for immunity, turning Mango users against the DEX.

That's also interesting that the attacker's address was funded by an FTX address.

Attacker address:

https://solscan.io/account/yUJw9a2Pyo…Xs2NqM

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Mango Markets V3
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) solana
Attack Technique Price Oracle Attack / Other
Classification Ecosystem / Exchange (DEX)
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Derivatives
Affected Token MGNO
Smart Contract Language Rust
Official Website mango.markets/
Protocol Twitter/X @mangomarkets
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of price oracle attack / other and Rust/Anchor program internals and the Solana account model
Capital Required Seed capital to cover Solana network fees and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with solana Solana programs and deploy a custom exploit program or signer account
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Mango Markets V3's program logic - root cause: ecosystem / exchange (dex)
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single Solana transaction (atomic across instructions)
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Price Oracle Attack / Other vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $116M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Mango Markets V3, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (October 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Price Oracle Attack / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Oracle Manipulation & Price Manipulation attack class for patterns
  • Audit oracle price feeds for manipulation risks - ensure time-weighted average prices (TWAPs) or multi-source aggregators are used, not spot prices
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Funds Recovery

59.5%

Recovered

$69.0M

Net Loss

46980000

Security Audit History

Post-Incident Timeline

  • 2022-10-17

    69,000,000 $USD has been recovered from the stolen funds by the hacker. After the finish of the proposal of returning part of the funds, the hacker and the Mango team decided to mark 47,000,000 $USD as a bug bounty for the hacker and returning of the remaining 69,000,000 $USD. A Twitter user named Abraham Eisenberg took the responsibility for the funds removal and said that it was not illegal action because he performed actions as the project was designed.

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Oracle Manipulation & Price Manipulation examples →

Sources & References

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