MASKSWAP Honeypot
What happened
De.Fi's REKT database lists MASKSWAP on BNB Smart Chain as an Exit Scam/Honeypot, stating that the contract owner could disable the transfer function and so restrict users from selling. In the verified code at 0x05fc8874…ddef2e, a public newun address is set automatically by the first transferFrom call, and from then on both transfer and transferFrom revert with "please wait" for any transfer addressed to newun. The owner can also reassign newun with transfernewun.
How it happened
newunstarts as the zero address. IntransferFrom, the first call with a non-zerofromassigns it without any restriction:if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to; else require(to != newun, "please wait");. That call is not owner-gated, sonewunbecomes whatever recipient the firsttransferFromnames. The code does not say which address that was.- Afterwards every call to
transferFromreaches theelsebranch, andtransferhas its own check,require(to != newun, "please wait");. A transfer tonewunreverts, so the sender's balance is not debited. The check tests the recipient only; it does not exempt the owner. - A swap that moves tokens from a holder to a liquidity pair uses
transferFromwith the pair as the recipient. If the pair is the address stored innewun, that sell reverts. The code alone does not show whethernewunis the pair. - The owner can change the target at any time with
function transfernewun(address _newun) public onlyOwner { newun = _newun; }. Setting it to the zero address re-arms the capture by the nexttransferFrom; pointing it at an unused address lifts the block for the pair. - Separately,
clearCNDAOisonlyOwnerand sends the contract's own native balance to the owner (_owner.transfer(address(this).balance)); the contract accepts native coin through its payable fallback. This is not a liquidity withdrawal path.
This describes what the code allows. No transaction in the evidence shows which address newun held or whether any sale failed.
Protocol details
Evidence
- report De.Fi REKT database listing (token_name MASKSWAP, Exit Scam/Honeypot, 2021-05-05) twitter.com
- address BscScan verified source, MASKSWAP 0x05fc88744640168f3ecbe9eaeb1d84369dddef2e bscscan.com
- analysis Scam explained: BSC stealthy LP block (Crypto T3ddy Bear blog) cryptot3ddybear.gitlab.io
- analysis Sourcify copy, MASKSWAP repo.sourcify.dev
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