Meter.io Hack
Incident Overview
The attacker's address:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d3d13ca…AF4D01
The attacker minted a substantial amount of BNB and WETH tokens, draining the bridge reserve of its BNB and wETH before all bridge transactions could be halted by Meter. This case also impacted the Hundred Finance on Moonriver.
Meter_io Passport is a fork of ChainSafe's ChainBridge, but with one change introduced to the deposit method of the ERC20 Handler.
The extended code had a wrong trust assumption which allowed the hacker to call the underlying ERC20 deposit function to fake a BNB or ETH transfer.
Exploit scenario:
- the Meter Bridge Contract provided by ChainSafe Systems has a vulnerability in deposit() function
- deposit() function doesn't check calldata "data" parameter to be matched with the message value in the function call
- this vulnerability allows anybody to call this function with fake deposit data and not be reverted
the attacker exploited this vulnerability and make a few deposits from the Ethereum network:
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdfea6413…9e31f7
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2d398796…0b629c
- the attacker exploited this vulnerability and made a few deposits from the BSC network:
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc4d7e160…984950
https://bscscan.com/tx/0x63f37aff…f7ed8e
https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc7eb98e0…d8ffdc
- the attacker called swapOut() to withdraw a fake deposited amount from another chain:
https://moonriver.moonscan.io/tx/0xb3298f62…0d7050
- the attacker used AnySwap and cBridge to collect all funds in the Ethereum address
Stolen funds were deposited into Tornado Cash mixer on Ethereum:
https://bloxy.info/txs/transfers_from/0x8d3d13ca…af4d01?currency_id=1
Incident Report
What the Attacker Needed to Succeed
Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.
What Auditors Should Check
If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Meter.io, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (February 2022).
- Verify all logic paths related to Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
- Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs
Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.
Free TrialSources & References
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Source 3 https://rekt.news/meter-rekt/
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Learn to Prevent the Next Meter.io
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