Mochi.market Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
Ethereum
Honeypot

What happened

This "Mochi.market" (MOMA) token on Ethereum (0x9fd4f831…220e26, deployed on 25 April 2021) copied the name and symbol of the Mochi.market NFT marketplace token and is a different contract from the one Ethplorer lists for that project (0xbd1848e1…4bd55b). Its transfer code lets the pool send tokens to buyers but stops ordinary holders from selling: a modifier on every transfer and transferFrom only lets the deployer, the _safeOwner address and owner-whitelisted wallets move tokens freely, and a sale to the pool fails with the misleading error "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance". The deployer can whitelist or blacklist any address through functions disguised as increaseAllowance and addApprove, and the contract has no function to transfer or renounce ownership.

De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as a honeypot exit scam on 25 April 2021 in which the owner restricted users from selling; no loss figure is recorded.

How it happened

  1. The constructor hard-codes _name = 'Mochi.market' and _symbol = 'MOMA', sets _owner and _safeOwner to the deployer and mints 100,000,000 MOMA with _mint(_owner, 100*1e6*(10**18)).
  2. On the deployer's first outgoing transfer, if (_owner == _safeOwner && sender == _owner){_safeOwner = recipient;_;} makes that recipient _safeOwner. If that transfer is the liquidity deposit, the pool becomes _safeOwner and can send tokens freely, so buys go through.
  3. Every other transfer passes only if sender == _owner || sender == _safeOwner || recipient == _owner or _whiteAddress[sender] == true.
  4. A holder who is not whitelisted falls through to require((sender == _safeOwner)||(recipient == _unirouter), "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds balance"). A Uniswap sale moves tokens from the holder to the pool, not to the router, so it reverts with an error that looks like a balance problem.
  5. The only exception is if (amount < _sellAmount). _sellAmount starts at 0 and is set only by an owner transfer to itself. Below that threshold a transfer succeeds, but a transfer to _safeOwner then blacklists the sender: if(recipient == _safeOwner){_blackAddress[sender] = true; _whiteAddress[sender] = false;}.
  6. Owner-only functions with standard-looking names manage the lists: increaseAllowance(address[]) whitelists, addApprove(address[]) blacklists, decreaseAllowance(address) sets _safeOwner, and multiTransfer sends tokens and whitelists the first approvecount receivers. A public owner-only _mint can add supply to _owner at any time.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract MOMA

Evidence

Same attack technique

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