MonoX Hack
What happened
On November 30, 2021, an attacker exploited MonoX's single-sided AMM on Ethereum and Polygon. A swap path allowed MONO to be both the input and output token, inflating its internal virtual price and allowing the attacker to exchange overpriced MONO for the pools' real assets.
The swap function did not reject identical input and output token addresses. Applying distinct buy and sell price-update paths to the same asset broke the AMM's virtual-price accounting invariant.
How it happened
- MonoX independently updated the virtual price for tokenIn and tokenOut.
- When both addresses were MONO, the final output-side update overwrote the input-side adjustment and ratcheted MONO's price upward.
- The attacker repeated the same-token swap, then used the artificially expensive MONO to drain WETH, WMATIC, WBTC, stablecoins, and other pooled tokens across both deployments.
Protocol details
Security review history
- Halborn View report
- PeckShield View report
Evidence
Proof of concept
1 availableSources
- report @BlockSecTeam incident report twitter.com
- report @MonoXFinance incident report twitter.com
- report Post-mortem rekt.news
- report @FrankResearcher incident report twitter.com
- report MonoX Exploit Post-Mortem medium.com
- transaction Transaction polygonscan.com
- transaction Transaction etherscan.io
- analysis Detailed Analysis of the $31 Million MonoX Protocol Hack slowmist.medium.com
- analysis Website reference knownseclab.com
- analysis Twitter/X Alert tuoniaox.com
- analysis DeFiLlama defillama.com
- analysis MonoX Protocol Hack Analysis sharkteam.org
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