NOZOMI COIN Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

NOZOMI COIN (NZMI) is a BNB Chain token deployed on 9 May 2021 at 0x44fc3ffd…dc87f1. Its transferFrom saves the recipient of the first transferFrom call as newun; when liquidity is added through the PancakeSwap router, that recipient is the pair. After that, every transfer or transferFrom into newun reverts with "please wait", so tokens can be bought out of the pair but no holder can sell into it.

Only the owner, hard-coded as 0x9bB3Dca8…061ca4, can change newun, and the contract has no renounceOwnership. The deployed NZMI contract also accepts BNB and lets the owner withdraw it with clearCNDAO. De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an exit scam/honeypot.

How it happened

  1. The constructor sets owner = 0x9bB3Dca8ea023cD3921cd5A661A577Bd0d061ca4 and mints the whole supply, 10,000,000,000 NZMI at 18 decimals, to that address.
  2. transferFrom begins with if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to;. When the owner adds liquidity, the router moves the owner's tokens into the PancakeSwap pair with transferFrom, which would set newun to the pair.
  3. From then on transferFrom runs require(to != newun, "please wait"), and transfer runs the same check. A router sale sends the seller's tokens into the pair, so it reverts; buys send tokens out of the pair and pass.
  4. transfernewun(address _newun) is onlyOwner, so only the owner can point newun elsewhere and reopen sales.
  5. Whoever holds the pool's LP tokens can remove liquidity at any time, because the pair paying out tokens is a transfer from newun, not to it. The blog post De.Fi cites describes this template's exit as pulling liquidity after one-way buying.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract NZMI

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