Ola Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $4.0M
Medium Reentrancy / Other fuse

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain fuse Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #472 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

The attacker's address:

https://explorer.fuse.io/address/0x371D7C9e…D63d75/transactions

The example transaction behind the exploit:

https://explorer.fuse.io/tx/0x1b3e06b6…b1dc90/token-transfers

The hack is made possible by the incompatibility between the Compound fork and ERC677/ERC777-based tokens, which have the built-in callback functions exploited to allow for reentry in doTransferOut() function and draining of the loan pool.

The attacker was initially funded by Tornado in Ethereum:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x98c46fc9…a24efb

After the exploit execution, funds were delivered back into Ethereum and transferred to the following wallet:

https://etherscan.io/address/0xbcdb800d…118f42

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Ola Finance
Date of Incident
Affected Chain(s) fuse
Attack Technique Reentrancy / Other
Classification Smart Contract Language / Borrowing and Lending
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type CDP
Smart Contract Language Solidity
Official Website ola.finance/
Protocol Twitter/X @ola_finance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Unverified

Market Context at Time of Hack

Token Categories
Solana Ecosystem

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of reentrancy / other and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with fuse smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Ola Finance's contract logic - root cause: smart contract language / borrowing and lending
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Reentrancy / Other vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $4.0M. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Ola Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (March 2022).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Reentrancy / Other are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Reentrancy attack class for patterns
  • Check that all state-changing functions follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern to prevent reentrancy and logic ordering bugs
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

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Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Reentrancy examples →

Sources & References

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