How much was lost in the Original.finance hack?

The Original.finance hack resulted in — in losses on August 26, 2021.

What attack technique was used in the Original.finance exploit?

The Original.finance exploit utilized Rugpull. Understanding this attack vector is critical for smart contract auditors and developers building secure DeFi protocols.

How can developers prevent similar smart contract attacks?

Preventing smart contract hacks requires a combination of secure coding practices, thorough security audits, and understanding common attack vectors like reentrancy, oracle manipulation, and access control flaws. Smart Contract Hacking (SCH) provides hands-on training to help developers and auditors identify and prevent vulnerabilities before deployment.

Original.finance Hack

TOTAL LOST —

Aug 26, 2021 Rugpull binance

Affected Chain binance Incident surface

Recovered - No recovery reported

Same Technique 865 Total incidents

Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

Origami is a first-in-class automated leverage protocol launching on Ethereum and 🐻

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Original.finance

Date of Incident August 26, 2021

Affected Chain(s) binance

Attack Technique Rugpull

Classification Token

Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Leveraged Farming

Affected Token Original.finance

Official Website original.finance/

Protocol Twitter/X @origami_fi

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of rugpull and Solidity and EVM internals

Capital Required Seed capital to cover gas and initial position setup

On-Chain Access Ability to interact with binance smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract

Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Original.finance's contract logic - root cause: token

Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block

Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Hard to catch — private key / OpSec failures are outside smart contract audit scope

Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost —. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Original.finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (August 2021).

Verify all logic paths related to Rugpull are guarded by proper access controls and input validation
Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Audit Report 1 Report

Sources & References

01
Source 1 https://rugdoc.io/project/original-finance/

Threat Assessment

Severity Level

UNKNOWN

Attack Vector Rugpull
Root Cause Token
Year 2021

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