RAMBBO Finance Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

RAMBBO Finance is a BEP-20 token whose transfer and transferFrom functions both revert with "please wait" when the recipient equals a stored address called newun. In transferFrom, the first call made while newun is zero stores that call's recipient in newun, and from then on nothing can be sent to that address, which is the path a sell through a router or a direct transfer to a pair would take. The owner can also change newun with transfernewun.

De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an exit scam/honeypot in which the contract owner could disable the transfer function and restrict users from selling.

How it happened

  1. The constructor mints the whole supply to the deployer: balances[owner] = _totalSupply; with _totalSupply = 30000000000000e8.
  2. transferFrom contains if(from != address(0) && newun == address(0)) newun = to; else require(to != newun, "please wait");. The first transferFrom with a non-zero from therefore stores its recipient as newun, with no check on who that recipient is. If that first call is the liquidity deposit into a trading pair, the pair becomes newun; the code does not show which address it was.
  3. Every later transferFrom and every transfer runs require(to != newun, "please wait"). Once newun is the pair, any sell that sends tokens to the pair reverts, while a buy (tokens leaving the pair to a buyer through transfer) does not hit that check.
  4. The block applies to all senders; the owner has no exemption, but the owner can call transfernewun(address _newun) (onlyOwner) to repoint newun. Setting it to zero re-arms the capture on the next transferFrom; pointing it at an unused address lifts the block.
  5. clearCNDAO() (onlyOwner) sends the contract's own BNB balance to the caller with _owner.transfer(address(this).balance). It does not touch pair liquidity, and the code alone does not show whether any BNB was held there.
  6. What happened: the code does not show any call by the owner. Only De.Fi's REKT database listing supports the honeypot classification; its Token Sniffer proof tweet could not be opened.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract RAMBBO

Evidence

Same attack technique

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