Rose Finance Hack

TOTAL LOST $45K
Low Flash Loan Attack

Summarize with AI

Affected Chain 2024 Incident surface
Recovered - No recovery reported
All-Time Rank #1744 By amount stolen
Auditors 1 Prior security audit

Incident Overview

Rosa Finance suffers $44,670 USD loss in flash loan attack on Arbitrum.

On January 18th, 2024, Rosa Finance, a decentralized non-custodial liquidity market protocol on Arbitrum, fell victim to a flash loan attack. The attacker exploited the project, stealing various cryptocurrencies including 12,601 DAI, 2,749 USDC, 0.2317 WBTC, 97.12 GMX, 3,873 ARB, and 3,396 PENDLE, amounting to a total loss of $44,670 USD. At the time of this report, the stolen funds remain in the attacker's address.

Attacker Address:

https://arbiscan.io/address/0x54949211…E4d1c8

Malicious Transaction:

https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xd54088b8…a02bf8

Malicious Contract:

https://arbiscan.io/address/0x6858f645…B946e6

Incident Report

Protocol / Project Rose Finance
Date of Incident
Attack Technique Flash Loan Attack
Classification Borrowing and Lending
Primary Source View Post-Mortem

Protocol Information

Protocol Type Lending
Affected Token ROSA
Official Website www.rosafinance.io/
Protocol Twitter/X @rosa_finance
Team Anonymous
Source Code Verified On-Chain

What the Attacker Needed to Succeed

Understanding the prerequisites for this type of attack helps auditors identify protocols that are most at risk and helps developers build better defenses.

Technical Knowledge Deep understanding of flash loan attack and Solidity and EVM internals
Capital Required Flash loan capital (borrowed atomically, zero upfront cost)
On-Chain Access Ability to interact with smart contracts and deploy a custom exploit contract
Protocol Analysis Identification of the exploitable vulnerability in Rose Finance's contract logic - root cause: borrowing and lending
Execution Speed Precise transaction ordering and timing to exploit the vulnerability within a single atomic block
Obfuscation Plan A strategy to launder and move stolen funds - typically through mixers, cross-chain bridges, or decentralized DEX swaps to resist tracing

What Auditors Should Check

Could this have been caught in audit? Yes — skilled auditors routinely flag Flash Loan Attack vulnerabilities in code review
Audited by Audit Report 1 — still lost $45K. Prior audits don't guarantee safety, especially after post-audit code changes.

If you're auditing a protocol with similar architecture to Rose Finance, these are the critical security checks that could have prevented this incident (January 2024).

  • Verify all logic paths related to Flash Loan Attack are guarded by proper access controls and input validation - see the Flash Loans Attacks attack class for patterns
  • Review privileged functions (owner, admin, governance) for potential abuse vectors - centralization risks should be documented and bounded with timelocks or multi-sigs

Master these auditing techniques with hands-on labs and real exploit scenarios in the Smart Contract Hacking course.

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Security Audit History

Related Attack Classes

The technique used in this hack maps to these vulnerability classes in our security curriculum:

See all Flash Loans Attacks examples →

Sources & References

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