SAD CAT Honeypot

Reported loss Not disclosed
BNB Chain
Honeypot

What happened

SAD CAT (SCAT) is a BNB Chain token at 0x7d45fe6c…d7d0b1, deployed on 2021-05-14. Its _transfer function contains a switch TIME that starts as true and reverts any transfer whose sender is not the owner or the address stored in pancake, unless the recipient is the owner. The revert message talks about one sale per 30 minutes, but no timer is checked: while the switch is on the revert is unconditional, so a holder's sell fails.

The owner can flip the switch with setTIME. De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Honeypot dated 2021-05-14 and says the owner could disable the transfer function, which restricted users in selling their tokens.

How it happened

  1. bool private TIME = true; is set at declaration, so the trading restriction is active from deployment.
  2. In _transfer, if(sender == owner()){ pancake = recipient; } makes the recipient of every owner transfer the exempt address pancake, and the owner can also set it directly with addPancake. The code does not show which address pancake points at.
  3. The block is if(sender != owner() && recipient != owner() && sender != pancake && TIME == true){ revert("FOR VALUE PROTECTION, YOU CAN ONLY SELL 1 Sale PER 30 MIN"); }. The test is on sender, which for a holder's sell is the holder, so it reverts. Transfers out of pancake and transfers into the owner pass. The transData timestamp saved elsewhere is never read, so there is no 30 minute window.
  4. A revert happens before _balances[sender] is debited, so a blocked holder keeps the tokens but cannot move them.
  5. The owner can lift the block with setTIME(bool), or keep it. Two further owner levers exist: GTYA(address,bool) marks an address in bot, after which if(bot[sender] == true){ require(amount <=0, "bots......"); } reverts all its transfers because amount > 1000 is required earlier, and fire(uint256) plus POOL(address,bool) set a per-transaction MAX (initially 10000e18) for transfers to flagged recipients.
  6. What happened: De.Fi's REKT database lists SAD CAT as an Exit Scam/Honeypot. No opened transaction in this review shows the owner flipping TIME, flagging an address or removing liquidity.

Protocol details

Classification Token
Protocol Type Exit Scam/Honeypot
Affected asset / contract SCAT

Evidence

Same attack technique

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