SAFEGUARD Honeypot

What the code allows:

1. The constructor makes the deployer the owner and mints 50000e18 tokens (50,000) to it. There is no public mint function after that.
2. Both transfer and transferFrom call _transfer, which calls calculateFeesBeforeSend(sender, recipient, amount) for every move of tokens.
3. That function begins with if(PanCakeSwapReciever[recipient]){ revert("Error: Can not sell this token"); }. A revert undoes the whole transaction, so a transfer to a flagged recipient fails for every sender, including the owner. A sell through a router sends tokens to the pair, so it would fail if the pair address is flagged; the code does not show which addresses are flagged.
4. setPanCakeSwapReciever(address _recipient, bool _feeless) is onlyOwner and sets PanCakeSwapReciever[_recipient] = _feeless;, so the owner can switch the block on or off for any address at any time. Unlike the other whitelist setters, it is not tied to canWhitelist, so renounceWhitelist() does not disable it.
5. The fee code is cosmetic: calculateFeesBeforeSend otherwise returns (amount, 0), so seTxFee and feeDistributor never take anything. renounceOwnership() exists; if called, the flags would stay as they were at that moment.

De.Fi's REKT database lists the token as an Exit Scam/Honeypot. No transaction showing the owner setting the flag, a failed sell, or liquidity removal was opened.